CAPITAL UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ISLAMABAD

A Key Exchange Protocol Based on Matrices over Galois Field

by

Tahira Mushtaq

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the
degree of Master of Philosophy

in the

Faculty of Computing
Department of Mathematics

2025

To my parents, teachers and friends for their support and love.

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

A Key Exchange Protocol Based on Matrices over Galois Field

by

Tahira Mushtaq

(Registration No: MMT231012)

THESIS EXAMINING COMMITTEE

S. No.	Examiner	Name	Organization
(a)	External Examiner	Dr. Ayesha Rafiq	IST, Islamabad
(b)	Internal Examiner	Dr. Abdul Rehman Kashif	CUST, Islamabad
(c)	Supervisor	Dr. Rashid Ali	CUST, Islamabad

Dr. Rashid Ali
Thesis Supervisor
September, 2025

Dr. Muhammad Sagheer
Head
Dept. of Mathematics
September, 2025

Dr. Muhammad Abdul Qadir
Dean
Faculty of Computing
September, 2025

Author's Declaration

I, **Tahira Mushtaq** hereby state that my MPhil thesis titled "**A Key Exchange Protocol Based on Matrices over Galois Field**" is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from Capital University of Science and Technology, Islamabad or anywhere else in the country/abroad.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my graduation, the University has the right to withdraw my MPhil Degree.



(Tahira Mushtaq)

Registration No: MMT231012

Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in this thesis titled "**A Key Exchange Protocol Based on Matrices over Galois Field**" is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and Capital University of Science and Technology towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of MPhil Degree, the University reserves the right to withdraw/revoke my MPhil degree and that HEC and the University have the right to publish my name on the HEC/University website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized work.



(Tahira Mushtaq)

Registration No: MMT231012

Acknowledgement

First of all, I would like to thank Almighty Allah for His countless blessings in my life. He has gifted me a loving family and excellent teachers. He supports me in every path of life. I would like to express my special thanks to my kind supervisor **Dr. Rashid Ali** for his motivation. His unfailing patience and encouragement kept me in good stead. I would never be able to forget his key contribution to one of the most fruitful endeavour of my life. I have appreciated the guidance for my supervisor and feeling proud to be a student of such great teacher. Also, many thanks are due to all teachers of CUST Islamabad **Dr. Muhammad Sagheer, Dr. Abdul Rehman Kashif, Dr. Muhammad Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Sabeel, Dr. Rashid Ali, Dr. Dur-e-Shehwar** and **Dr. Samina Rashid** for their appreciation and support.

I am grateful to the management staff of Capital University of Science and Technology, Islamabad for providing a friendly environment for studies.

I am grateful to my Friend **Muhammad Rafi** and my Mother **Zanaib Nisa** for their prayers and motivation. I would like to thank my brothers and sister for their support in completing my degree program. They supported and encouraged me throughout my life. I would like to thank my all family members for their continuous support and patience during my research work. I also feel honored to have such supporting friends. I would like to say special thank to my friends Sadia Majeed , Hira Nabeel, Sajida Mustaq, Fouzia Khanum, Shahida Tabraiz and Muhammad Rafi for providing me the strength to get focused toward my main objectives. Finally, I am obliged to all people who have shared their knowledge and supported me all along.

(Tahira Mushtaq)

Registration No: MMT231012

Abstract

This thesis presents a quantum-resistant key exchange protocol based on matrix operations in non-commutative polynomial rings, designed to address the vulnerabilities of classical cryptographic systems to quantum attacks. The protocol leverages the inherent complexity of matrix polynomial factorization and the hardness of the conjugacy search problem in algebraic structures where matrix multiplication does not commute. By utilizing invertible matrices with polynomial entries reduced modulo an irreducible polynomial, the system establishes secure shared keys between parties through a series of matrix exponentiation and conjugation operations. The security of the protocol relies on the computational intractability of solving systems of nonlinear equations derived from matrix polynomial operations, a problem currently resistant to known quantum algorithms. Key advantages include enhanced resistance to quantum attacks, efficient performance due to structured polynomial arithmetic, and compact key sizes suitable for constrained environments. Practical applications span secure IoT communications, blockchain systems, and post-quantum cryptographic standards. Through theoretical analysis and implementation benchmarks, this work demonstrates that the proposed protocol achieves robust security while maintaining computational efficiency. The results position the method as a viable alternative to existing post-quantum cryptographic schemes, offering a unique combination of algebraic security and practical deployability.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DLP	Discrete Logarithm Problem
DH	Diffie Hellman
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
GF	Galois Field
GL	General Linear Group
LWE	Learning With Error
MDLP	Matrix Discrete Logarithum Problem
MITM	Man In The Middle Attack
MPF	Matrix Power Function
MQ	Multivariate Quadratic
PQC	Post Quantum Cryptography
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SVP	Short Vector Problem

Symbols

$\mathbb{F}_q$	Finite Field
$\mathbf{B}_{pub}$	Public Key
M	Message
$\mathbb{Z}$	Set of Integers
$\mathbb{C}$	Set of Complex Numbers
$\mathbb{N}$	Set of Natural Numbers
$\mathbb{R}$	Ring
$\mathbb{F}$	Field
$\mathbb{Q}$	Set of Rational Numbers
$\mathbb{M}_n R$	Matrix Ring
$\mathbb{H}$	Group

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Cryptography has been essential for securing communication and protecting sensitive information from adversaries. Throughout history, various cryptographic methods have been developed to ensure message confidentiality. Early techniques, such as shift ciphers, date back over two thousand years. These basic methods later advanced into more sophisticated systems, including monoalphabetic ciphers, the Playfair cipher [1], and different forms of the Hill cipher [2]. As cryptographic techniques improved, so did the methods to attack them, leading to the continuous development of stronger encryption mechanisms [3].

Today, cryptography [4] is crucial for secure data transmission over untrusted networks. Five core elements of any cryptography system are plaintext (Known text), encryption , decryption, ciphertext (secure text), and key. Beyond ensuring confidentiality, cryptography also supports other security goals, such as authenticity, consistency, reliability, and availability. Cryptographic methods are widely classified into two main types: symmetric key and asymmetric key cryptography [5]. Symmetric cryptography relies on a single shared key for both encryption and decryption. While efficient, this approach faces challenges in securely distributing keys, particularly in large or decentralized systems. If the secret key is compromised, all encrypted

communications become vulnerable. Well-known symmetric algorithms include the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). To overcome the key exchange limitations of symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography was introduced in 1976 [6]. This approach uses a public key to encrypt data and a secure key to decrypt data. Public key can be shared freely without creating any risk for the private key, this scheme improves key management security. Popular asymmetric schemes include RSA [7], ElGamal [8], and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), all of which are widely used in secure communication protocols.

Emergence of quantum computing presents a serious challenge to conventional public-key cryptography. Algorithms like Shor's can solve certain mathematical problems, such as integer factorization problems and matrix discrete logarithms exponentially problems faster than classical computers. Since these problems form the basis of widely used cryptosystems like RSA [7], ECC [5], and Diffie-Hellman (DH) [9], their security is now compromised in the face of quantum threats. Consequently, these traditional encryption methods are no longer deemed safe against attacks from quantum-powered adversaries.

This challenge has driven research toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Different algorithms designed to resist quantum computing threats [10]. One of the most promising approach is lattice-based cryptography, which relies on complex problems like the shortest vector problem (SVP) [11] and the learning with errors (LWE) problem. These problems are believed to be difficult for both classical and quantum computers. Lattice-based schemes, such as NewHope [12]and Kyber, provide efficient and secure key exchange methods and are currently under consideration for standardization by organizations like NIST. Other PQ approaches include cryptographic systems based on multivariate quadratic equations (MQ) and non-commutative algebraic structures, such as braid groups and matrix groups. For example, key exchange protocols using matrix power functions over finite fields or non-commutative groups offer alternative security frameworks. These methods rely on problems like the conjugacy search problem or the discrete logarithm problem in non-abelian groups, which are thought to be resistant to both classical and quantum attacks. Thus, the transition to quantum-resistant key exchange system marks a critical shift in cryptography. It highlights the importance of developing protocols which give solution to problems that

remain hard for both classical and quantum adversaries-ensuring long-term security in the post-quantum era [1].

1.2 Diffie Hellman Key Exchange and Post Quantum Cryptography

The Diffie Hellman key exchange protocol, introduced in 1976 by W.Diffie and M.Hellman [6], brought a major transformation to the field of cryptography by offering a practical solution for two parties to establish a shared secret key over an insecure communication path without requiring any prior arrangement of secret keys. This method became a fundamental component in the secure communication systems and is broadly used in protocols such as transport layer security, secure shell, and internet protocol security, where it plays a fundamental role in initiating encrypted sessions.

Despite its widespread application, the reliability of the W.Diffie and M.Hellman protocol is challenged by quantum computing system. Protocol security relies on the computational difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem, which is solved efficiently by using Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer [13].

This capability undermines the security guarantees of the protocol in a future where quantum devices become practical. In anticipation of such threats, the cryptographic community has shifted its focus toward methods that are believed to remain secure even when quantum technology is available. These approaches are collectively referred to as post-quantum cryptography. They are based on mathematical problems that are currently believed to be resistant to quantum attacks, such as those involving complex structures in lattices, error correcting codes, and certain types of functions on elliptic curves [14].

One prominent example is the NewHope protocol, which is built on the ring learning with errors problem and offers an efficient and practical alternative for secure key exchange in a quantum resistant setting [15]. These emerging protocols aim to retain the essential features of the original Diffie Hellman approach while offering improved security in a future shaped by quantum computing.

1.3 Literature Review

Ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communication requires a reliable method for exchanging secret keys. Traditional schemes developed in the early days of public key cryptography, such as those based on the hardness of factoring large integers or computing discrete logarithms, have long served this purpose using classical computational assumptions. Later refinements led to the use of algebraic structures that enabled comparable levels of security with reduced computational overhead and smaller key sizes [16]. Combinations of classical methods have also been proposed, integrating encryption and key agreement protocols in order to counter specific threats, such as impersonation or interception attacks, by embedding authentication mechanisms [17]. The emergence of quantum computing introduces significant concerns for these conventional approaches. Quantum algorithms, particularly the one developed by Shor, can solve the mathematical problems underlying classical encryption and key exchange in polynomial time, rendering traditional methods such as those relying on number-theoretic assumptions vulnerable [18]. To counter these risks, two principal directions have emerged: quantum-based secure communication protocols and quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. The former includes systems that employ quantum mechanical principles like superposition and measurement disturbance for establishing secret keys, with notable protocols such as BB84 [19]. Some variants, including those that require minimal trust in devices [20], offer enhanced theoretical guarantees but are often hindered by implementation complexity and scalability challenges. On the other hand, post-quantum cryptography aims to develop secure systems that remain functional within existing digital frameworks.

Algorithms based on hard problems in lattice theory have gained prominence in this area, with key encapsulation mechanisms such as Kyber, NewHope, and FrodoKEM showing promising performance and being actively evaluated for standardization. These constructions are already being integrated into widely used protocols like Transport Layer Security and Secure Shell [21, 22]. Recent work has also explored collaborative key establishment methods involving multiple users, as well as algebraic systems based on polynomial matrix operations over finite fields, including non-commutative structures such as general linear groups over quotient rings [23, 24]. Together, these

developments reflect a shift toward designing cryptographic systems that are robust not only against current computational threats but also against the anticipated capabilities of quantum machines.

1.4 Current Research

Recent research has focused on constructing quantum-safe cryptographic protocols leveraging the algebraic structures of polynomial matrices over finite fields and extension rings. These schemes utilize non-commutative matrix groups defined over polynomial quotient rings, such as $\mathbb{F}_p[x]/\langle m(x)\rangle$, to build key exchange and encryption methods that resist quantum attacks. The protocol example above illustrates the use of invertible polynomial matrices, irreducible polynomials, and modular arithmetic for secure key derivation and verification. Such matrix power function based approaches provide promising alternatives to classical discrete logarithm or factoring based systems, which are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. Current studies investigate the efficiency, invertibility conditions, and algebraic complexity of these matrix polynomial operations to ensure robustness and practicality in post-quantum cryptography [14, 21].

1.5 Thesis Structure

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 presents the foundational concepts and essential definitions related to cryptography and relevant mathematical terminology. It further discusses hash functions along with their fundamental properties, and concludes with a detailed examination of the matrix power function (MPF) and its key characteristics.

Chapter 3 reviews the article "A Matrix Multiplication Approach to Quantum-Safe Cryptographic Systems" by Lizama-Pérez [25]. The study introduces a novel cryptographic framework that moves away from traditional number-theoretic methods, mitigating vulnerabilities to classical and quantum attacks—including those leveraging

Shor's algorithm [25]. By utilizing matrix multiplication in finite fields, the approach advances the design of cryptographic systems resistant to quantum computing threats.

Chapter 4 analyzes an adapted key exchange protocol based on polynomial matrix rings. The method functions within the group of invertible matrices defined over the quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_q[x]/\langle f(x)\rangle$, where $\mathbb{F}_q$ denotes a finite field and $f(x)$ is an irreducible polynomial. Detailed algorithmic structures for key exchange and verification are provided, along with practical examples to demonstrate the modified protocol's operation in this algebraic setting.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

2.1 Cryptology

Cryptology represents the scientific study of secure communication methods designed to function in adversarial environments. This discipline comprises two complementary aspects: cryptography, which concerns the design of systems for information protection through encryption, and cryptanalysis, which focuses on evaluating and compromising such protective systems.

Rooted in mathematical theory, computational complexity, and algorithmic principles, cryptology establishes mechanisms to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. These fundamental capabilities enable critical security applications including digital signatures, secure communication protocols, authentication mechanisms, distributed ledger technologies, and protected network communications.

FIGURE 2.1: Types of Cryptology

According to William Stallings, "Cryptology is the area of study that encompasses both cryptography and cryptanalysis" [26]. It serves as the base for making communication secure systems, balancing the dual challenges of creating robust cryptographic schemes and analyzing their vulnerabilities.

2.1.1 Cryptography

Cryptography constitutes the scientific field dedicated to information protection through data transformation into formats inaccessible to unintended recipients. The discipline's etymology derives from Greek roots: *kryptos* (concealed) and *graphia* (writing). Historical applications appear in ancient civilizations, notably in Egyptian symbolic carvings and Greek military communication strategies. A seminal early example includes the substitution cipher attributed to Julius Caesar, which systematically shifted alphabetical characters by predetermined intervals to obscure sensitive military correspondence.

The evolution of cryptographic methods has transitioned from rudimentary manual techniques to complex algorithmic systems based on advanced mathematics. Contemporary cryptography forms the cornerstone of digital security, enabling essential protections including data privacy, communication verification, and identity confirmation. These capabilities fundamentally support secure electronic interactions, financial transactions, and digital authentication mechanisms in modern networked environments [4].

2.1.2 Cryptanalysis

Cryptanalysis is the study of evaluating and breaking cryptographic systems by uncovering vulnerabilities or deriving the original message without access to the secret encryption key. As the analytical counterpart to cryptography, it represents the second major branch of cryptology. The main objective of cryptanalysis is to reverse the encryption process, either by recovering the original plaintext or by determining the encryption key. Various attack models are employed in cryptanalysis depending on the level of access the adversary has. These include ciphertext only attacks, where

only encrypted data is available; known plaintext attacks, where both plaintext and corresponding ciphertext are known; chosen plaintext attacks, in which the attacker can encrypt arbitrary messages; and chosen ciphertext attacks, where the adversary can decrypt selected ciphertexts.

Modern cryptanalysis integrates a range of mathematical disciplines such as algebra, number theory, and probability, along with computational complexity and algorithm design. As noted by Stallings, "Cryptanalysis is the process of attempting to discover the plaintext or key" [26]. It plays a vital role not only in testing the robustness of encryption methods but also in driving the advancement of more secure cryptographic techniques.

2.1.3 Basic Components of Cryptography

The fundamental elements comprising cryptographic systems include:

1. Plaintext: The initial intelligible information requiring protection through cryptographic means.
2. Ciphertext: The transformed output resulting from encryption, appearing as random data without proper decoding.
3. Encryption process: The mathematical procedure that systematically converts plaintext to ciphertext through key-dependent operations.
4. Decryption mechanism: The inverse transformation that restores ciphertext to its original plaintext form when provided with the correct key.
5. Cryptographic key: The confidential parameter that controls both encryption and decryption operations, ensuring security through controlled access.

These interdependent elements constitute the essential framework for all cryptographic implementations, from classical ciphers to modern encryption standards [26].

2.2 Classification of Cryptography

There are two main disciplines of cryptography symmetric Key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography.

2.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography

Symmetric key cryptography, alternatively referred to as private key cryptography, operates on the principle of using a single key for both encryption and decryption. This approach requires that communicating parties securely share and maintain the confidentiality of this common key to ensure protected message exchange.

Compared to asymmetric cryptographic systems, symmetric algorithms demonstrate superior processing speed and lower computational overhead, characteristics that make them particularly effective for handling substantial data encryption tasks. Prominent implementations of this approach include the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and the Blowfish cipher algorithm. According to William Stallings, "Symmetric encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the same key. A secure channel is required for key exchange between the communicating parties." [26].



FIGURE 2.2: Symmetric Cryptography

2.2.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography

Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a pair of keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. Unlike symmetric cryptography, the keys are mathematically related but not identical, and knowledge

of the public key does not compromise the security of the private key. This approach enables secure communication without the need to share a secret key in advance. It is widely used for secure data transmission, digital signatures, and authentication. According to William Stallings, "Asymmetric encryption is a form of encryption in which the sender and receiver use different keys. Each user has a pair of keys: a public key, which is known to others, and a private key, which is known only to that user" [26].



FIGURE 2.3: Asymmetric Cryptography

2.3 Diffusion and Confusion

In symmetric cryptography, the concepts of **diffusion** and **confusion** serve as fundamental principles for constructing secure encryption schemes. These ideas, originally introduced by Claude Shannon, help ensure that encrypted messages are resistant to statistical and structural analysis.

2.3.1 Diffusion

Diffusion is the technique of dispersing the statistical structure of the plaintext across the ciphertext. Ideally, altering a single bit in the input should lead to significant and widespread changes in the output. This spreading effect hides any patterns that

might be present in the plaintext, thereby weakening attempts at frequency analysis. Techniques such as permutations and linear transformations are often used to achieve diffusion.

2.3.2 Confusion

Confusion focuses on making the relationship between the encryption key and the ciphertext as intricate as possible. A well designed cipher will ensure that small changes in the key lead to unpredictable changes in the ciphertext. This is typically accomplished through the use of non-linear functions, such as substitution boxes (S-boxes), which introduce complexity and prevent straightforward key recovery.
By combining these two properties, modern encryption algorithms like AES and DES achieve high levels of security. Diffusion helps mask plaintext patterns, while confusion obscures key influence, making both brute force and analytical attacks more challenging [26–28].

2.4 Mathematical Background

Definition 2.4.1. "A ring is a set R with two binary operations $+$ and $\cdot$ such that [29]:

1. $(R, +)$ is an abelian group.
2. Associativity of multiplication For all $a, b, c \in R$,
$$(a \cdot b) \cdot c = a \cdot (b \cdot c).$$
3. Distributive laws: For all $a, b, c \in R$,
$$a \cdot (b + c) = (a \cdot b) + (a \cdot c)$$
$$(b + c) \cdot a = (b \cdot a) + (c \cdot a).$$"

Example 2.4.2. The set $\{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\}$ with addition and multiplication modulo n forms a commutative ring with unity, denoted $(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}, \oplus, \otimes)$.

Definition 2.4.3. "A ***field*** is a set F with two binary operations $+$ and $\times$ such that [30]:

1. $(F, +)$ is an abelian group
2. $(F \setminus \{0\}, \times)$ is an abelian group, where 0 is the additive identity
3. Distributive law: For all $a, b, c \in F$,

$$a \times (b + c) = (a \times b) + (a \times c).$$"

Example 2.4.4. The set of rational numbers $\mathbb{Q}$ with standard addition and multiplication forms a field, where 0 is the additive identity and 1 is the multiplicative identity.

2.4.1 One-Way Function

A function $f\colon \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is called one-way function if it satisfies the following:

1. Efficient Computation: Deterministic polynomial time algorithms exists a that compute $f(x)$ for any value of x.
2. Intractability of Inversion: For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the probability of successfully finding a preimage x' such that $f(x') = y$ (given $y = f(x)$ for a randomly chosen x) is negligible. Formally, for every positive polynomial $p(\cdot)$ and sufficiently large n [28].

$$\Pr_{\substack{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\ \text{over } \mathcal{A}\text{'s randomness}}} \left[\mathcal{A}(f(x), 1^n) \in f^{-1}(f(x))\right] < \frac{1}{p(n)},$$

Example 2.4.5. Let $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ denote the multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime p. Define:

$$f\colon \{1, \ldots, p-1\} \times \{1, \ldots, p-1\} \to \mathbb{Z}_p^*, \quad f(g, x) = g^x \bmod p$$

This function is conjectured to be one-way because:

- Forward Easy: Computing $g^x \bmod p$ is efficient via square-and-multiply.

- Backward Hard: Solving x from $(g, g^x \bmod p)$ is the discrete logarithm problem.

Definition 2.4.6. "A finite field (or Galois field) is a field with a finite number of elements. It satisfies all the field axioms [30]:

1. It is an abelian group under addition.
2. The non-zero elements form an abelian group under multiplication.
3. Multiplication distributes over addition.

The order (number of elements) of a finite field is always a prime power p^n, and for each prime power, there is essentially only one finite field of that order, denoted GF(p^n) or F_{p^n}".

Example 2.4.7. Consider GF(4) = $\mathbb{F}_4$ with $p = 2$, $k = 2$:

a. Elements: $\{\mathfrak{o}, \mathfrak{1}, \mathfrak{a}, \mathfrak{a}+1\}$.
b. Addition $\diamond$ defined by polynomial addition modulo 2.
c. Multiplication $\star$ defined modulo $x^2 + x + 1$.
d. $\mathfrak{a}^2 = \mathfrak{a} + 1$.

This forms a field with 4 elements where every non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse.

Definition 2.4.8. Matrix multiplication is a binary operation that combines two matrices to form a new matrix. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be an $r \times s$ matrix and $\mathcal{N}$ an $s \times t$ matrix. The product, denoted $\mathcal{M} \star \mathcal{N}$, results in an $r \times t$ matrix. The element at the μth row and νth column of $\mathcal{M} \star \mathcal{N}$ is obtained by computing the inner product of the μth row of $\mathcal{M}$ and the νth column of $\mathcal{N}$. This operation is well-defined only when the number of columns in $\mathcal{M}$ equals the number of rows in $\mathcal{N}$ [31].

Key Properties:

1. Matrix multiplication ($\star$) is generally non-commutative.
2. All diagonal matrices commute with each other.

3. Any matrix commutes with its own powers: $\mathcal{X} \star \mathcal{X}^n = \mathcal{X}^n \star \mathcal{X}$.

4. The identity matrix $\mathcal{I}$ commutes with every matrix: $\mathcal{X} \star \mathcal{I} = \mathcal{I} \star \mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}$.

Example 2.4.9. Let

$$\mathcal{M} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & 4 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathcal{N} = \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 6 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix}$$

Then the matrix product $\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{N}$ is:

$$\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{N} = \begin{bmatrix} (1 \cdot 5) + (2 \cdot 7) & (1 \cdot 6) + (2 \cdot 8) \\ (3 \cdot 5) + (4 \cdot 7) & (3 \cdot 6) + (4 \cdot 8) \end{bmatrix} \mod 11 = \begin{bmatrix} 19 & 22 \\ 43 & 50 \end{bmatrix} \mod 11$$

$$\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{N} = \begin{bmatrix} 8 & 0 \\ 10 & 6 \end{bmatrix} \mod 11$$

Definition 2.4.10. The **inverse of a square matrix** $\mathcal{A}$, denoted $\mathcal{A}^{-1}$, is defined as the matrix that satisfies:

$$\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{A}^{-1} = \mathcal{A}^{-1} \times \mathcal{A} = \mathcal{I},$$

where $\mathcal{I}$ is the identity matrix of the same order as $\mathcal{A}$ [32]. A matrix $\mathcal{A}$ is said to be *invertible* (or *nonsingular*) if and only if such an inverse matrix $\mathcal{A}^{-1}$ exists. This occurs precisely when the determinant of the matrix is nonzero, i.e., $\det(\mathcal{A}) \neq 0$.

Matrix inversion is particularly important in solving linear systems. For a system $\mathcal{A} \times \boldsymbol{\chi} = \boldsymbol{\beta}$, if $\mathcal{A}^{-1}$ exists, the unique solution is:

$$\boldsymbol{\chi} = \mathcal{A}^{-1} \times \boldsymbol{\beta}$$

Example 2.4.11. Consider the matrix:

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 1 \\ 5 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

First, compute the determinant:

$$\det(\mathcal{A}) = (2)(3) - (1)(5)$$

$$\det(\mathcal{A}) = 6 - 5 = 1 \neq 0$$

Since the determinant is nonzero, $\mathcal{A}$ is invertible. Its inverse is:

$$\mathcal{A}^{-1} = \frac{1}{\det(\mathcal{A})} \begin{bmatrix} 3 & -1 \\ -5 & 2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & -1 \\ -5 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

2.4.2 Modular Multiplicative Inverse

In polynomial modular arithmetic, the modular multiplicative inverse of a polynomial $\phi(t)$ modulo another polynomial $\mu(t)$ is a polynomial $\psi(t)$ satisfying [33]:

$$\phi(t) \cdot \psi(t) \equiv 1 \pmod{\mu(t)}.$$

This means that $\phi(t)\psi(t)$ is divisible by $\mu(t)$, or equivalently, the remainder of $\phi(t)\psi(t)$ divided by $\mu(t)$ is 1. Such an inverse $\psi(t)$ exists if and only if $\phi(t)$ and $\mu(t)$ are coprime, that is,

$$\gcd(\phi(t), \mu(t)) = 1.$$

The inverse can be computed using the *Extended Euclidean Algorithm* for polynomials. This algorithm finds polynomials $\psi(t)$ and $\kappa(t)$ such that the gcd (which is 1) is expressed as a linear combination:

$$1 = \phi(t)\psi(t) + \mu(t)\kappa(t).$$

Reducing this identity modulo $\mu(t)$ immediately yields the desired congruence, as the term $\mu(t)\kappa(t)$ vanishes:

$$\phi(t)\psi(t) \equiv 1 \pmod{\mu(t)}.$$

Thus, the polynomial $\psi(t)$ obtained from the extended Euclidean algorithm is the modular inverse of $\phi(t)$ modulo $\mu(t)$.

Example 2.4.12. Find inverse of 550 mod 1759.

Use the Euclidean algorithm to find the inverse of 550 mod 1759.

Q	$\mathbf{T}_1$	$\mathbf{T}_2$	$\mathbf{T}_3$	$\mathbf{S}_1$	$\mathbf{S}_2$	$\mathbf{S}_3$
	1	0	1759	0	1	550
3	0	1	550	1	-3	109
5	1	-3	109	-5	16	5
21	-5	16	5	106	-339	4
1	106	-339	4	-111	355	1

TABLE 2.1: Inverse of 550 is 355.

From the last row we have:

$$106 \cdot 1759 + (-339) \cdot 550 = 1.$$

$$-339 \cdot 550 = 1 \pmod{1759}.$$

Therefore, the modular inverse is:

$$550^{-1} = -339 = 1420 = 355 \pmod{1759}.$$

Example 2.4.13. Find the inverse of $a(v_1) = v_1^2 + 1$ modulo $m(v_1) = v_1^5 + v_1 + 1$ over F_2 (binary coefficients).

Solution

$Q(v_1)$	$T_1(v_1)$	$T_2(v_1)$	$R(v_1)$	$V_1(v_1)$	$V_2(v_1)$	$S(v_1)$
	1	0	$v_1^5 + v_1 + 1$	0	1	$v_1^2 + 1$
$v_1^3 + v_1$	0	1	$v_1^2 + 1$	1	$v_1^3 + v_1$	$v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$
1	1	$v_1^3 + v_1$	$v_1^2 + x + 1$	-1	$v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$	v_1
$v_1 + 1$	-1	$v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$	v_1	$v_1 + 1$	$v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$	1
v_1	$v_1 + 1$	$v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$	1	$-$	$-$	0

TABLE 2.2: Extended Euclidean Algorithm for $(v_1^2 + 1)^{-1} \mod v_1^5 + v_1 + 1$. The inverse is $v_2(v_1) = v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$.

Since the final remainder is 1, the inverse of $v_1^2 + 1$ modulo $v_1^5 + v_1 + 1$ is:

$$(v_1^2 + 1)^{-1} = v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 \mod (v_1^5 + v_1 + 1).$$

2.5 Matrix Exponentiation Operation

The matrix exponentiation operation refers to the mathematical process of raising a square matrix $\mathcal{M} \in \mathfrak{R}^{d \times d}$ over a ring $\mathfrak{R}$ to an integral exponent $t \in \mathbb{Z}$. For non-negative exponents, this operation is defined recursively through repeated matrix multiplication:

$$\mathcal{M}^t = \begin{cases} \mathcal{I}_d & \text{if } t = 0 \\ \prod_{i=1}^{t} \mathcal{M} = \underbrace{\mathcal{M} \circ \mathcal{M} \circ \cdots \circ \mathcal{M}}_{t \text{ times}} & \text{if } t > 0 \end{cases}$$

where $\mathcal{I}_d$ represents the d-dimensional identity matrix and $\circ$ denotes matrix multiplication. When $\mathcal{M}$ admits diagonalization through similarity transformation

$$\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{S}\Lambda\mathcal{S}^{-1}$$

with diagonal matrix Λ, the computation simplifies to:

$$\mathcal{M}^t = \mathcal{S}\Lambda^t\mathcal{S}^{-1}$$

2.5.1 Negative Exponents and Properties

For negative exponents ($t < 0$), the operation requires matrix $\mathcal{M}$ to be invertible, such that:

$$\mathcal{M}^{-t} = (\mathcal{M}^{-1})^t$$

Fundamental properties include:

1. Associativity: $(\mathcal{M}^t)^s = \mathcal{M}^{ts}$.
2. Non-commutativity: $\mathcal{M}^t\mathcal{N}^t \neq (\mathcal{M}\mathcal{N})^t$ in general.

3. Dimension restriction: Defined exclusively for square matrices.

4. Distributivity: $\mathcal{M}^{t+s} = \mathcal{M}^t \mathcal{M}^s$ when $t, s \geq 0$.

This operation forms the foundation for advanced matrix function theory and has significant implications in both theoretical and applied mathematics [34, 35].

2.6 Matrix Discrete Logarithm Problem

The Matrix Discrete Logarithm Problem (MDLP) generalizes the conventional discrete logarithm problem to the setting of matrix groups over finite algebraic structures. Let G be a subgroup of the general linear group $GL_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$, consisting of invertible $n \times n$ matrices with entries from the finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$.

Given two matrices $\mathbb{A}, \mathbb{B} \in G$ where $\mathbb{B}$ equals some power $\mathbb{A}^\alpha$ of $\mathbb{A}$ for an unknown integer exponent α, the MDLP requires determining this exponent α from the matrix equation:

$$\mathbb{B} = \mathbb{A}^\alpha$$

where the exponentiation denotes repeated matrix multiplication.

The computational complexity of MDLP typically exceeds that of the standard discrete logarithm problem, primarily due to the non-commutative algebraic structure of matrix groups. For specific classes of matrix groups to particularly non-abelian subgroups , this problem is conjectured to be computationally intractable. This presumed hardness forms the theoretical foundation for various cryptographic schemes designed to resist quantum computing attacks [36].

2.7 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism enables two parties to securely establish a shared cryptographic key across an unsecured communication channel. The protocol's security stems from the computational complexity of solving the discrete logarithm

problem in finite cyclic groups. The protocol operates within a finite field $\mathbb{F}_p$ where p is a large prime number and g is a primitive root modulo p (where $1 < g < p$).

The key exchange proceeds through the following steps.

Step 1: Key Generation

1. Both parties publicly agree on (p, g).
2. Party $\mathcal{A}$ selects private key $a \in \{2, \ldots, p-2\}$.
3. Party $\mathcal{B}$ selects private key $b \in \{2, \ldots, p-2\}$.

Step 2: Generation of Public Key

$$\mathcal{A} \text{ computes: } A = g^a \mod p$$
$$\mathcal{B} \text{ computes: } B = g^b \mod p$$

Both parties independently compute the shared secret:

$$\mathcal{A} \text{ computes: } K = B^a \pmod p$$
$$\mathcal{B} \text{ computes: } K = A^b \pmod p$$

By algebraic identity notics that the computation of A yields:

$$K = B^a$$

$$K = B^a = (g^b)^a = g^{ba} = g^{ab}$$

and the computation of B yields:

$$K = A^b$$

$$K = A^b = (g^a)^b = g^{ab}$$

$$K = g^{ab} \pmod p$$

Example 2.7.1. By selecting the prime modulus $p = 61$. Choose generator $g = 6$ (verified primitive root). As stated above, the followings steps will be processed for the common shared secret key.

Two participants, Alice ($\mathcal{A}$) and Bob ($\mathcal{B}$), perform:

1. $\mathcal{A}$ selects private key $a = 17$.
2. $\mathcal{B}$ selects private key $b = 23$.

Public Key Exchange: Both parties A and B compute the public keys by using their secret keys as follows:

$$\mathcal{A} \text{ computes: } A \equiv g^a \pmod{p} = 6^{17} \pmod{61}$$
$$\mathcal{B} \text{ computes: } B \equiv g^b \pmod{p} = 6^{23} \pmod{61}$$

Shared Secret Derivation: Both parties compute shared keys as follows:

$$\mathcal{A} \text{ computes: } K \equiv B^a \pmod{p}$$
$$\mathcal{B} \text{ computes: } K \equiv A^b \pmod{p}$$

By algebraic identity:

$$K \equiv g^{ab} \pmod{p}$$

Public Key Calculation: Public key computation follows these steps:

$$\begin{aligned}
A &= 6^{17} \pmod{61} \\
&= 6^{16} \times 6^1 \pmod{61} \\
&= (6^8)^2 \times 6 \pmod{61} \\
&= (16^2) \times 6 \pmod{61} \quad (\text{since } 6^8 = 16 \pmod{61}) \\
&= 256 \times 6 \pmod{61} \\
&= 12 \times 6 \pmod{61} \\
A &= 72 \pmod{61} \\
A &= 11. \\
B &= 6^{23} \pmod{61} \\
&= 6^{16} \times 6^4 \times 6^3 \pmod{61} \\
&= 16 \times 34 \times 27 \pmod{61}
\end{aligned}$$

$$= 544 \times 27 \pmod{61}$$
$$= 56 \times 27 \pmod{61}$$
$$= 1512 \pmod{61}$$
$$= 50.$$

Shared Secret Computation:

$$\mathcal{A}'s \text{ computation: } K = 50^{17} \pmod{61}$$
$$= (50^8 \times 50^8 \times 50^1) \pmod{61}$$
$$= (58 \times 58 \times 50) \pmod{61}$$
$$= 168200 \pmod{61} = 59$$
$$= 59.$$
$$\mathcal{B}'s \text{ computation: } K = 11^{23} \pmod{61}$$
$$= (11^{16} \times 11^4 \times 11^3) \pmod{61}$$

$$= (50 \times 15 \times 31) \pmod{61}$$
$$= 23250 \pmod{61}$$
$$= 59.$$

2.8 Integer Factorization Problem

Definition 2.8.1. Let $N \in \mathbb{Z}$ be a composite integer such that $N = p \cdot q$, where $p, q \in \mathbb{Z}$ are large primes and $p \neq q$. The **integer factorization problem** asks: given N, find its non-trivial prime factors p and q [37]. Formally, for a composite number $N \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$, the problem is to determine integers $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_{>1}$ such that:

$$N = a \cdot b, \quad \text{with } 1 < a < N \text{ and } 1 < b < N.$$

This problem is believed to be computationally hard when N is the product of two large primes, and it underpins the security of several cryptographic schemes, including

RSA.

2.9 Blockchain Integration

Definition 2.9.1. Blockchain integration describes the process of embedding blockchain-based mechanisms within existing digital architectures to enhance attributes such as data authenticity, transparency, immutability, and distributed control. A blockchain is a decentralized and tamper resistant data structure built on distributed ledger technology (DLT), where records called *nodes* or *blocks* are chronologically chained using cryptographic hashes and replicated across a peer-to-peer network. To achieve consensus, integration often employs algorithms such as Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), or other decentralized agreement mechanisms that ensure trust among participants without a central coordinator [38].

Within business environments, blockchain integration commonly involves the use of *smart contracts* autonomous scripts deployed on the ledger that execute predetermined logic upon satisfaction of specific events. The applications of such systems span multiple sectors.

1. Logistics and Tracking: Monitoring and verifying product origin and delivery paths.
2. Financial Services: Enabling transparent, auditable transactions without reliance on third-party institutions.
3. Medical Systems: Protecting and sharing confidential health records with integrity.
4. Digital Identity: Managing self-sovereign identities and credential verification.

On the technical side, effective integration demands infrastructure that bridges off-chain operations with on-chain execution. This includes components such as application programming interfaces (APIs), data oracles, communication layers, and blockchain clients. In private or permissioned settings, platforms like Hyperledger

Fabric or Quorum are favored due to their modular consensus frameworks, privacy preserving features, and scalable performance [38]. Nevertheless, adopting blockchain within existing digital ecosystems raises several design and operational challenges.

1. System Compatibility: Ensuring seamless data flow between legacy systems and blockchain components.
2. Confidentiality and Compliance: Meeting legal and ethical standards (e.g., GDPR) while handling sensitive data.
3. Performance Bottlenecks: Supporting large-scale operations with minimal delay and resource consumption.
4. Governance Models: Aligning decentralized technologies with structured enterprise oversight.

2.10 Lattice-Based Cryptography

Lattice-based cryptography builds secure encryption systems using complex mathematical problems involving high dimensional grid structures called lattices. These cryptographic techniques derive their strength from computationally hard problems like finding the shortest vector in a lattice (SVP), locating the nearest lattice point to a given vector (CVP), and solving error-based learning problems (LWE), all of which remain difficult even for quantum computers. Unlike traditional methods relying on factoring or discrete logarithms, lattice-based approaches offer quantum resistance while enabling advanced features like homomorphic encryption and secure digital signatures. Their security stems from robust mathematical foundations where breaking the system would require solving provably hard lattice problems, making them ideal candidates for post-quantum cryptography standards due to their strong security guarantees and computational efficiency. [14].

Lattice-based cryptographic constructions are attractive because they offer conjectured resistance to quantum attacks, support advanced features like fully homomorphic encryption, and are based on worst case hardness assumptions. For instance,

Regev's Learning With Errors (LWE) problem forms the basis for many encryption, digital signature, and identity-based encryption schemes [39]. Gentry's breakthrough construction of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) also relies on lattice problems [40]. Moreover, schemes like NTRUEncrypt and Ring-LWE-based constructions are practical and efficient [9, 41].

Due to their strong theoretical foundations and quantum resistance, lattice-based schemes are considered strong candidates for post-quantum cryptography and are under active standardization by organizations such as NIST.

Chapter 3

Quantum-Resistant Encryption Through Matrix Operations

In this chapter review of an article "A matrix multiplication approach to quantum-safe cryptographic systems" [25] is discussed. The protocol avoids vulnerabilities tied to traditional number-theoretic assumptions, ensuring robustness against both classical and quantum cryptanalysis (e.g., Shor's algorithm). Beside this added review of some classical and quantum key exchange protocols.

3.1 The Origins of RSA and its Foundation

The RSA algorithm, one of the first practical public key cryptosystems, was developed in 1977 by three prominent cryptographers: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. All three researchers were working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at the time of their groundbreaking discovery. The algorithm's name comes from the initials of their surnames: Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. Its security is based on the computational difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers, a problem for which no efficient solution has been found despite decades of extensive research. This revolutionary method solved the key distribution problem that had plagued symmetric cryptography, enabling secure communication over insecure channels without a pre-shared secret. For this contribution, the trio was awarded

the prestigious A.M. Turing Award in 2002. Today, RSA remains a cornerstone of modern cryptography, fundamental to the security of countless internet protocols, digital signatures, and secure transactions worldwide.

3.1.1 RSA Key Exchange Protocol

The RSA protocol involves two parties, Alice and Bob, who wish to communicate securely over an insecure channel. The process consists of key generation, key distribution, encryption, and decryption.

Key Generation:

Step 1
Alice selects two distinct large prime numbers, p and q, and computes their product:

$$n = p \times q,$$

here, n is the **modulus** for both public and private keys.

Step 2
The totient function $\phi(n)$ is calculated as:

$$\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

this function determines the number of integers less than n that are coprime with n.

Step 3
Alice chooses an integer e such that:

$$1 < e < \phi(n) \quad \text{and} \quad \gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$$

the pair (e, n) forms the **public key**.

Step 4
The private key d is the modular inverse of e modulo $\phi(n)$:

$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

This ensures:

$$e \times d = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

The pair (d, n) is the **private key**.

Key Distribution:

Alice shares her public key (e, n) with Bob, while keeping d secret.

Encryption:

Bob converts his message M (where $0 \leq M < n$) into ciphertext C using Alice's public key:

$$C = M^e \pmod{n},$$

he then transmits C to Alice.

Decryption (Alice):

Alice retrieves the original message M using her private key d:

$$M = C^d \pmod{n},$$

due to Euler's theorem, this correctly reverses the encryption:

$$C^d = (M^e)^d = M^{ed} = M^{k\phi(n)+1} = M \pmod{n}.$$

Security Considerations:

The security of RSA fundamentally relies on the computational difficulty of the **factoring problem**, as an attacker cannot feasibly derive the private exponent d from the public pair (e, n) without knowing the prime factors p and q. Modern implementations therefore use very large key sizes, such as 2048 or 4096 bits, to ensure that the modulus n cannot be factored by any known brute-force or advanced mathematical attacks, like the Number Field Sieve, within a practical timeframe

3.2 ElGamal Key Exchange Mechanism

The ElGamal procedure establishes a secure channel through number theoretic principles distinct from factorization based systems. Its operation relies on three core components:

$$\mathcal{T} = (p, g, \mathbb{G}),$$

where:

1. p denotes a substantial prime integer.
2. g represents a primitive root modulo p.
3. $\mathbb{G}$ signifies the cyclic group $\langle g \rangle$.

3.2.1 Participant Setup

Each entity generates their cryptographic material through this process:

1. Secret Selection: Choose $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \{2, \ldots, p-2\}$.
2. Public Computation: Derive $\beta \equiv g^{\alpha} \pmod{p}$.

The pair (β, p, g) becomes publicly available while α remains confidential.

3.2.2 Secure Message Transmission

To protect message $M \in \mathbb{G}$:

1. Generate ephemeral secret $k \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, \ldots, p-2\}$.
2. Compute the masking components:

$$\gamma = g^{k} \pmod{p}.$$
$$\delta = M \cdot \beta^{k} \pmod{p}.$$

The ordered pair (γ, δ) constitutes the protected message package.

3.2.3 Message Recovery

The designated recipient processes the package using their secret α:

$$M = \delta \cdot \gamma^{-\alpha} \pmod{p},$$

this equivalence holds because:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \cdot \gamma^{-\alpha} &= M \cdot \beta^k \cdot (g^k)^{-\alpha} \\ &= M \cdot (g^\alpha)^k \cdot g^{-k\alpha} \\ &= M \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

3.2.4 Security Analysis of ElGamal Exchange

The security of the ElGamal exchange mechanism relies fundamentally on the computational hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in cyclic groups: given public parameters $\mathcal{T} = (p, g, \mathbb{G})$ where $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$ is a multiplicative subgroup of order $p-1$, and knowing $\beta \equiv g^\alpha \pmod{p}$, it remains computationally infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary to recover the private exponent α when p is a sufficiently large safe prime (typically ≥ 2048 bits). This intractability persists even when observing protocol transcripts $(\gamma, \delta) = (g^k \pmod{p}, M \cdot \beta^k \pmod{p})$, as deriving either the ephemeral key k or message M would require solving either:

1. The discrete log problem for (g, γ), or
2. The computational Diffie-Hellman problem for (g, β, γ).

The protocol achieves semantic security through its randomized encryption process, where each message M is protected by a fresh random k, ensuring identical plaintexts produce distinct ciphertexts. However, advancements in quantum computing threaten this assumption.

Quantum algorithms, particularly Shor's algorithm, could solve the discrete logarithm

problem efficiently on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. Thus, although ElGamal remains secure against classical computational threats, it is not considered secure in a post-quantum context. For this reason, cryptographic research is increasingly focused on developing quantum-resistant protocols [26].

3.3 A Matrix Multiplication Approach to Quantum-Safe Key Exchange

"A Matrix multiplication approach to quantum-safe key exchange" [25] using integer matrices enhances security through exponentiation and non-commutative properties. This scheme is based on matrices taken from $GL(n, \mathbb{Z})$ which are non commutative. This scheme is very effective against the cryptanalysis quantum based attacks.

3.3.1 Setup Parameters

As stated earlier,the scheme is based on non commutative matrices .For this scheme non commutative matrices are taken from general linear group of matrices and powers are integers form group of integers. This most important role is of the conjugation property of matrices.

1. Let n be the matrix dimension (e.g., $n \geq 256$ for 128-bit security).
2. Choose two public matrices $M, N \in GL(n, \mathbb{Z})$ (invertible integer matrix).
3. Select large secret exponents $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}$ (minimum 256-bit integers).

First compute the product of M and N, there product is non-commutative i.e

$$MN \neq NM$$

3.3.2 Key Generation

Bilal's Key Generation:

1. Choose random secret exponent $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}$.
2. Compute public key: $B_{pub} = (MN)^{\beta}$ and,
3. Bilal publish his public key B_{pub}.

Ayesha's Key Generation:

1. Choose random secret exponent $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}$.
2. Ayesha also compute her public key: $A_{pub} = (NM)^{\alpha}$.
3. Send A_{pub} to Bilal.

3.3.3 Key Exchange Protocol

1. Bilal computes K_{AB} by utilized the information sent by Ayesha:

$$(A_{pub})^{\beta} = (NM)^{\alpha\beta}$$

2. Now Bilal apply the conjugation property of matrices,

$$K_{BA} = M^{-1} \cdot (MN)^{\alpha\beta} \cdot M$$

3. Bilal can also apply the conjugation property of matrices,

$$K_{AB} = N^{-1} \cdot (NM)^{\beta\alpha} \cdot N$$

3.3.4 Correctness of the Scheme

In this section, the correctness of the scheme is established, such that

$$\begin{aligned} K_{BA} &= M^{-1} \cdot (MN)^{\beta\alpha} \cdot M \\ &= M^{-1} \cdot MN \cdot MN \cdot MN \cdot \cdots \cdot MN \cdot M \\ &= (M^{-1}M)(NM.NM.NM) \cdots (NM) \quad \because M^{-1}M = I \\ &= I(NM)^{\beta\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

$$= (NM)^{\alpha\beta} \quad \because \beta\alpha = \alpha\beta$$
$$= K_{AB}$$

This show the protocol is correct.

Example 3.3.1. Let the prime modulus be $p = 11$,the public matrices are defined as

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 4 \end{pmatrix}, \quad N = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 2 \\ 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

First, calculate M^{-1} as follow:

$$\det(M) = (2 \times 4) - (3 \times 1) = 5.$$

M is invertible.

Using Extended Euclidean algorithm to calculate M^{-1}.

$$5^{-1} = 9 \mod 11$$

$$5 \times 9 = 45 = 1 \mod 11$$

$$\text{Adj}(M) = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & -3 \\ -1 & 2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 8 \\ 10 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

The matrix inverse of M is given by ;

$$M^{-1} = \det(M)^{-1} \cdot \text{Adj}(T)$$

$$M^{-1} = 9 \times \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 8 \\ 10 & 2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 6 \\ 2 & 7 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

Calculate N^{-1} as follow:

$$\det(N) = (5 \times 1) - (2 \times 3) = \det(N) = -1 = 10 \mod 11$$

$$10^{-1} = 10 \mod 11 since 10 \times 10 = 100 = 1 \mod 11$$

$$\text{Adj}(N) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -2 \\ -3 & 5 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 9 \\ 8 & 5 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11$$

$$N^{-1} = 10 \times \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 9 \\ 8 & 5 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 2 \\ 3 & 6 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

Ayesha chooses her secret key as $\alpha = 3$ and proceed for the computation of public key A_{pub} as follow:

1. Compute $NM \mod 11$:

$$NM = \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 2 \\ 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 4 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 12 & 23 \\ 7 & 13 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11$$
$$= \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 7 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

2. Calculate public key $(A_{pub})^{\alpha} = (NM)^3 \mod 11$:

$$(NM)^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 7 & 2 \end{pmatrix}^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 3 \\ 10 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$
$$(A_{pub})^{\alpha} = (NM)^3 \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 3 \\ 10 & 10 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

Bilal's secret key is $\beta = 2$ and proceed for the computation of B_{pub} as follow:

1. Compute $MN \mod 11$:

$$MN = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 5 & 2 \\ 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 19 & 7 \\ 17 & 6 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 7 \\ 6 & 6 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

2. Calculate public key $B_{pub} = (MN)^2 \mod 11$:

$$(B_{pub})^{\beta} = (MN)^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 7 \\ 6 & 6 \end{pmatrix}^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 10 \\ 7 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11.$$

Ayesha Computes K_{BA} as follows:

1. Receives $(B_{pub})^{\beta}$ from Bilal.

2. Computes $(B_{pub})^{\beta\alpha} \mod 11$:

$$(B_{pub})^{\beta\alpha} = \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 10 \\ 7 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^3 \mod 11$$

$$(B_{pub})^{\beta\alpha} = ((MN)^2)^3 = \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 5 \\ 9 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11$$

Bilal Computes K_{AB} by following these steps:

1. Receives A_{pub} from Ayesha.

2. Verifies using conjugation:

$$K_{AB} = N^{-1}(A_{pub})^{\alpha\beta}N \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 5 \\ 9 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \mod 11$$

Verification, follows from that fact that both parties obtain identical shared key:

$$K_{BA} = K_{AB} = \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 5 \\ 9 & 4 \end{pmatrix}$$

Example 3.3.2. Let the prime modulus be $p = 23$,the public matrices are defined as

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 5 & 1 \\ 3 & 7 & 4 \\ 6 & 9 & 8 \end{pmatrix}, \quad N = \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 6 \\ 5 & 2 & 7 \\ 4 & 8 & 9 \end{pmatrix}$$

with Bilal and Ayesha have secret keys as integers α and β respectively. They want to generate shared key, for this purpose they move with the following steps.

First, calculate $M^{-1}mod23$ as follow:

$$\det(M) = 2(7 \cdot 8 - 4 \cdot 9) - 5(3 \cdot 8 - 4 \cdot 6) + 1(3 \cdot 9 - 7 \cdot 6) = -39 = 7 \pmod{23}$$

$$7^{-1} = 10 \pmod{23}$$

$$7 \times 10 = 70 \equiv 1 \pmod{23}$$

$$\text{adj}(M) = \begin{pmatrix} 20 & -31 & 13 \\ 6 & 10 & -5 \\ -15 & 5 & -1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 20 & 15 & 13 \\ 6 & 10 & 18 \\ 8 & 5 & 22 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

$$M^{-1} = 10 \times \text{Adj}(M) = \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 12 & 21 \\ 0 & 22 & 9 \\ 13 & 3 & 11 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

Calculate $N^{-1} mod 23$ as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} \det(N) &= 3(2 \cdot 9 - 7 \cdot 8) - 1(5 \cdot 9 - 7 \cdot 4) + 6(5 \cdot 8 - 2 \cdot 4) \\ &= 61 = 15 \pmod{23} \\ 15^{-1} &\equiv 20 \pmod{23} \quad \text{since } 15 \times 20 = 300 = 1 \pmod{23} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Adj}(N) = \begin{pmatrix} -38 & 39 & -5 \\ -17 & 3 & 9 \\ 32 & -20 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 8 & 16 & 18 \\ 6 & 3 & 9 \\ 9 & 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23$$

$$N^{-1} = 20 \times \text{Adj}(N) = \begin{pmatrix} 22 & 21 & 15 \\ 5 & 14 & 19 \\ 19 & 14 & 20 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

Secret exponents: $\alpha = 5$, $\beta = 7$

Here α and β are used to compute key. Ayesha's chooses secret key ($\alpha = 5$) and proceed for the computation A_{pub} as follow:

1. Compute $NM \mod 23$:

$$NM = \begin{pmatrix} 45 & 76 & 55 \\ 58 & 102 & 108 \\ 86 & 157 & 108 \end{pmatrix} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 22 & 7 & 9 \\ 12 & 10 & 16 \\ 17 & 19 & 16 \end{pmatrix} \pmod{23}.$$

2. Calculate $A_{\text{pub}} = (NM)^5 \mod 23$:

$$A_{\text{pub}} = (NM)^5$$

$$A_{\text{pub}} = \begin{pmatrix} 22 & 7 & 9 \\ 12 & 10 & 16 \\ 17 & 19 & 16 \end{pmatrix}^5$$

$$A_{\text{pub}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 \\ 11 & 11 & 4 \\ 20 & 10 & 10 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$(A_{pub})^7 = ((NM)^5)^7$$

As,

$$(NM)^5 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 \\ 11 & 11 & 4 \\ 20 & 10 & 10 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23$$

$$(A_{pub})^7 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 9 & 2 \\ 11 & 11 & 4 \\ 20 & 10 & 10 \end{pmatrix}^7 \mod 23$$

$$(A_{pub})^7 = (NM)^{35} = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 5 & 20 \\ 20 & 9 & 3 \\ 11 & 10 & 15 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

Bilal's secret key is $\beta = 7$ and proceed for computation of B_{pub} as follow:

1. Compute $MN \mod 23$:

$$MN = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 5 & 1 \\ 3 & 7 & 4 \\ 6 & 9 & 8 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 6 \\ 5 & 2 & 7 \\ 4 & 8 & 9 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} 29 & 20 & 43 \\ 47 & 43 & 77 \\ 83 & 80 & 119 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} 12 & 20 & 10 \\ 14 & 3 & 11 \\ 3 & 19 & 10 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.$$

2. Calculate $B_{pub} = (MN)^7 \mod 23$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
B_{pub} &= (MN)^7 \\
&= \begin{pmatrix} 12 & 20 & 10 \\ 14 & 3 & 11 \\ 3 & 19 & 10 \end{pmatrix}^7 \\
B_{pub} &= \begin{pmatrix} 17 & 6 & 19 \\ 21 & 12 & 6 \\ 2 & 20 & 17 \end{pmatrix} \\
(B_{pub})^5 &= \begin{pmatrix} 17 & 6 & 19 \\ 21 & 12 & 6 \\ 2 & 20 & 17 \end{pmatrix}^5 \mod 23. \\
(B_{pub})^5 &= \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 16 & 2 \\ 21 & 12 & 19 \\ 4 & 13 & 13 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.
\end{aligned}
$$

Ayesha Computes K_{BA} as follow:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(B_{pub})^5 &= ((MN)^7)^5 \\
&= \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 16 & 2 \\ 21 & 12 & 19 \\ 4 & 13 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.
\end{aligned}
$$

Verification, follows from that fact that both parties obtain identical shared key:

$$
\begin{aligned}
K_{AB} &= N^{-1}(NM)^{35}N. \\
K_{AB} &= \begin{pmatrix} 22 & 21 & 15 \\ 5 & 14 & 19 \\ 19 & 14 & 20 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 5 & 20 \\ 20 & 9 & 3 \\ 11 & 10 & 15 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 6 \\ 5 & 2 & 7 \\ 4 & 8 & 9 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23 \\
K_{AB} &= \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 16 & 2 \\ 21 & 12 & 19 \\ 4 & 13 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \mod 23.
\end{aligned}
$$

$$K_{BA} = K_{AB} = \begin{pmatrix} 10 & 16 & 2 \\ 21 & 12 & 19 \\ 4 & 13 & 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

Chapter 4

A Key Exchange Protocol Based on Matrices over Galois Field

4.1 Introduction

The emergence of quantum computing poses a serious threat to classical cryptographic protocols, particularly those relying on the hardness of the discrete logarithm and integer factorization problems. Algorithms such as Shor's algorithm can solve these problems efficiently on a quantum computer, rendering widely-used schemes like the Diffie–Hellman key exchange insecure. In response to this challenge, researchers have explored alternative mathematical frameworks that remain resistant to quantum attacks. One promising direction involves leveraging algebraic structures based on polynomial matrices over finite fields. Specifically, the protocol discussed here operates within the group of invertible matrices over the quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle$, where $f(v_1)$ is an irreducible polynomial and $\mathbb{F}_q$ is a finite field. The general linear group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$ provides a non-commutative setting where operations like matrix exponentiation and conjugation are computationally intricate. These algebraic properties are used to construct a key exchange protocol whose security is based on the intractability of reversing such operations without access to the secret parameters. As a result, the scheme offers a mathematically robust and quantum-resistant approach to secure key exchange.

4.1.1 Setup Parameters

This key exchange scheme is constructed using non-commutative matrices whose entries are polynomials over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$, reduced modulo a fixed irreducible polynomial $f(v_1)$. These matrices are drawn from the general linear group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$, ensuring that each matrix is invertible under polynomial ring arithmetic. The protocol relies on the algebraic complexity of matrix conjugation and exponentiation in this setting, particularly leveraging the non-commutativity of matrix multiplication to enhance security. To initialize the system, the following parameters are defined: First, select the matrix dimension n, which should be at least 2 for basic demonstrations, and significantly larger for practical cryptographic strength. Then, choose an irreducible polynomial $f(v_1) \in \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]$ of suitable degree, which serves as the modulus for polynomial reduction. Two invertible matrices $\mathbf{S}$ and $\mathbf{T}$ are publicly chosen from the group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$. Each user selects a private integer exponent—denoted a and b—from a large domain, typically of high bit-length (e.g., 256-bit) to ensure strong security. A crucial aspect of this construction is that matrix multiplication in this algebraic setting is not commutative, which means that in general:

$$\mathbf{ST} \neq \mathbf{TS}$$

This non-commutativity is central to the hardness of reversing the key exchange process without access to the secret exponents.

4.1.2 Key Generation

Bilal's Key Generation:

1. Choose secret exponent $y \in \mathbb{Z}$.
2. Compute public key:

$$\mathbf{B}_{\text{pub}} = (\mathbf{ST})^y \mod f(v_1)$$

or alternatively,

$$\mathbf{B}_{\text{pub}} = (\mathbf{TS})^y \mod f(v_1).$$

3. Bilal publishes $\mathbf{B}_{\text{pub}}$.

Ayesha's Key Generation:

1. Choose secret exponent $x \in \mathbb{Z}$.

2. Compute intermediate shared key:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = (\mathbf{ST})^{xy} \mod f(v_1).$$

3. Compute public key:

$$\mathbf{A}_{\text{pub}} = (\mathbf{TS})^{a} \mod f(v_1).$$

4. Send $\mathbf{K}_{BA}$ to Bob.

4.1.3 Key Exchange Protocol

1. Bilal uses Ayesha's transmission to compute the shared key:

$$\mathbf{K}_{AB} = (\mathbf{TS})^{xy} \mod f(v_1).$$

2. Bilal may also verify using the conjugation property:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = \mathbf{S}^{-1} \cdot (\mathbf{ST})^{ab} \cdot \mathbf{S} \mod f(v_1).$$

3. Likewise,

$$\mathbf{K}_{AB} = \mathbf{T}^{-1} \cdot (\mathbf{TS})^{ab} \cdot \mathbf{T} \mod f(v_1).$$

4.1.4 Verification

$$\mathbf{K}_{AB} = (\mathbf{TS})^{xy} \mod f(v_1).$$

If

$$\mathbf{K}_{AB} = \mathbf{K}_{BA} \quad \text{or}$$

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = (\mathbf{ST})^{xy} \mod f(v_1).$$

then both parties share the same session key.

4.1.5 Correctness of the Schem

To verify the correctness of the protocol, we examine how both participants compute the shared key. Suppose both users select private integers a and b, and define $x = ab$ as their combined exponent. The key computed by Bob after receiving Ayesha's transformed matrix can be expressed as:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = \mathbf{S}^{-1} \cdot (\mathbf{ST})^{xy} \cdot \mathbf{S} \mod f(v_1).$$

Expanding this expression, we observe that:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = \mathbf{S}^{-1} \cdot \underbrace{(\mathbf{ST}) \cdot (\mathbf{ST}) \cdots (\mathbf{ST})}_{x \text{ times}} \cdot \mathbf{S}$$

Since matrix multiplication is associative, we can regroup terms such that the outer conjugation by $\mathbf{S}$ cancels out:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = (\mathbf{TS})^{xy} \mod f(v_1).$$

This matches the key $\mathbf{K}_{AB}$ computed by Ayesha, demonstrating that both parties derive the same shared secret:

$$\mathbf{K}_{BA} = \mathbf{K}_{AB}$$

Therefore, the protocol is correct: the algebraic construction over the matrix ring modulo $f(v_1)$ ensures that both participants arrive at an identical key without directly sharing their private exponents.

4.1.6 Security Analysis

The security of this matrix-based key exchange protocol is rooted in the structural and computational complexity of the non-commutative group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$,

where $f(v_1)$ is an irreducible polynomial over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$. Within this group, all matrices are invertible and consist of polynomial entries reduced modulo $f(v_1)$, ensuring that computations take place in a finite and well-defined algebraic setting. One of the central security features arises from the non-commutativity of matrix multiplication in this group, which introduces asymmetry and obfuscation into the key derivation process.

Additionally, the use of conjugation and exponentiation in such a setting makes it computationally difficult for an adversary to isolate the secret exponents x or y without solving complex problems related to matrix decomposition and discrete logarithms in non-commutative rings. This hardness assumption serves as the foundation for resisting both classical and certain quantum attacks, provided that parameter sizes (e.g., matrix dimension n, field size q, and polynomial degree) are chosen appropriately. The protocol's reliance on algebraic properties, rather than traditional number-theoretic assumptions, provides a promising direction for post-quantum cryptography.

4.1.7 Non-Commutativity and Conjugation Hardness

The most fundamental security component of this protocol is the non-commutativity of matrix multiplication within the group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$. Given matrices $\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{T} \in GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$, the products $\mathbf{ST}$ and $\mathbf{TS}$ are generally not equal. This asymmetry is exploited through matrix exponentiation and conjugation to derive a shared secret between two parties. The protocol depends on the assumption that given $\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{S}^{-1}(\mathbf{ST})\mathbf{S}$, where $\mathbf{S}$ and $\mathbf{ST}$ are secret, it is computationally hard to recover either $\mathbf{S}$ or $\mathbf{ST}$ from $\mathbf{C}$. This is known as the conjugacy search problem in non-commutative groups. In our context, this problem is believed to be infeasible due to the complex interplay of matrix multiplication, polynomial reduction modulo $f(v_1)$, and the lack of efficient normal forms for such matrix rings.

4.1.8 Matrix Power Problem over Polynomial Rings

Core difficulty is the matrix power problem given a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$ and a power xy, computing $\mathbf{ST}^{xy}$ is straightforward, but inverting this operation (i.e.,

solving for xy given $\mathbf{ST}$ and $\mathbf{ST}^{xy}$) is considered hard.

This problem becomes especially resistant to attacks when the entries of $\mathbf{ST}$ are non-scalar polynomials, and all computations are performed modulo an irreducible polynomial $f(v_1)$, increasing the algebraic structure's unpredictability.

4.2 Attacks and Countermeasures

This section details attacks on the polynomial-based key exchange protocol, categorized into quantum and classical attacks. Each attack includes a mathematical description, an explanation of its mechanism, and a countermeasure. The protocol involves Alice and Bob computing public keys $\mathbf{A}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{TS})^x \mod f(v1)$ and $\mathbf{B}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{ST})^y \mod f(v1)$, respectively, to derive a shared key $\mathbf{K}_{AB} = (\mathbf{TS})^{xy} \mod f(v1)$, where $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$ are secret exponents, and $f(v_1)$ is a polynomial modulus.

4.2.1 Quantum Attacks

4.2.1.1 Shor's Algorithm Attack

Shor's algorithm solves the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time on a quantum computer, recovering x or y from $\mathbf{A}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{TS})^x \mod f(v1)$ or $\mathbf{B}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{ST})^y \mod f(v1)$. Using quantum Fourier transforms, the algorithm finds the period of the function $f(k) = (\mathbf{ST})^k \mod f(v_1)$, revealing x or y [42]. This compromises the shared key $\mathbf{K}AB = (\mathbf{TS})^{xy} \mod f(v1)$, with complexity $O(\log^3 |\mathbb{Z}|)$ [43].

Countermeasure: Adopt post-quantum schemes like lattice-based key exchange , which rely on problems such as Learning With Errors (LWE) that are resistant to quantum algorithms.

4.2.1.2 Grover's Algorithm Attack

Grover's algorithm reduces the brute-force search complexity for x or y from $O(|\mathbb{Z}|)$ to $O(\sqrt{|\mathbb{Z}|})$ by leveraging quantum search techniques. The attacker tests candidate

exponents against **A**pub or **B**pub, exploiting the matrix exponentiation structure. This quadratic speedup threatens smaller key sizes [44].

Countermeasure: Use a large integer set $\mathbb{Z}$ (e.g., 256-bit exponents) and a high-degree polynomial $f(v_1)$ to make the search space infeasible even with quantum speedup.

4.2.1.3 Quantum Meet-in-the-Middle Attack

A quantum meet-in-the-middle attack splits the computation of $(\mathbf{ST})^{xy} \mod f(v_1)$, searching for x and y with complexity $O(\sqrt[3]{|\mathbb{Z}|})$. The attacker computes intermediate values for parts of the exponent xy, using quantum search to find collisions, exploiting the associativity of matrix multiplication [45].

Countermeasure: Randomize matrices **S** and **T** (e.g., non-commutative structures) and use a large modulus $f(v_1)$ to increase the complexity of finding collisions.

4.2.2 Classical Attacks

4.2.2.1 Brute-Force Attack

The attacker tests all possible x or y in $\mathbf{A}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{TS})^x \mod f(v1)$, with complexity $O(|\mathbb{Z}|)$. By computing $(\mathbf{TS})^k \mod f(v_1)$ for all $k \in \mathbb{Z}$, the attacker checks for matches with $\mathbf{A}_{\text{pub}}$. This is only feasible for small $\mathbb{Z}$ [46].

Countermeasure: Select a large $\mathbb{Z}$ (e.g., 2^{256}) and a high-degree irreducible polynomial $f(v_1)$ to make exhaustive search computationally prohibitive.

4.2.2.2 Meet-in-the-Middle Attack

The attacker splits $(\mathbf{ST})^{xy} \mod f(v_1)$ into two lists, computing $(\mathbf{ST})^a$ and $(\mathbf{ST})^b$, finding a match with complexity $O(\sqrt{|\mathbb{Z}|})$. The attacker stores precomputed values and searches for a, b such that $(\mathbf{ST})^a = (\mathbf{ST})^b \cdot \mathbf{K}_{AB}$, leveraging matrix associativity [47].

Countermeasure: Use non-commutative matrix rings and a large modulus $f(v_1)$. Randomizing **S** and **T** structures disrupts collision finding.

4.2.2.3 Pollard's Rho Attack

This attack uses a cycle-finding algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm for x or y in $\mathbf{A}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{TS})^x \mod f(v1)$, with complexity $O(\sqrt{|\mathbb{Z}|})$. A pseudo-random sequence of matrix powers is generated, and cycle detection reveals x, exploiting the group structure of the matrix ring modulo $f(v_1)$ [46].

Countermeasure: Use a large modulus $f(v_1)$ and matrices with high group order (e.g., large determinants) to increase cycle length and computational cost.

4.2.2.4 Side-Channel Attack

The attacker analyzes timing or power consumption during $(\mathbf{ST})^y \mod f(v_1)$ computation to infer x or y. Non-constant-time implementations may leak exponent bits through execution time or power usage variations, compromising the secret [48].

Countermeasure: Implement constant-time matrix exponentiation and use blinding techniques (e.g., randomizing inputs) to mask timing and power patterns.

4.2.2.5 Algebraic Attack

The attacker exploits the algebraic structure of the matrix ring to solve $\mathbf{A}\text{pub} = (\mathbf{TS})^x \mod f(v1)$ using polynomial relations. By finding linear or polynomial relations in the ring defined by $f(v_1)$, the attacker reduces the discrete logarithm to a system solvable via Gröbner basis methods [49].

Countermeasure: Use a high-degree, irreducible polynomial $f(v_1)$ and complex, nondiagonalizable matrices $\mathbf{S}$, $\mathbf{T}$ to make algebraic relations hard to compute.

4.2.2.6 Decomposition Attack

The attacker attempts to decompose $\mathbf{ST}$ into simpler matrices to recover x or y from $(\mathbf{ST})^x \mod f(v_1)$ [50]. If $\mathbf{ST}$ can be factored into simpler components, the discrete logarithm problem may reduce to linear algebra, compromising the key [51].

Countermeasure: Choose $\mathbf{S}$ and $\mathbf{T}$ with high algebraic complexity (e.g., non-commuting, high-order) and a large, irreducible $f(v_1)$ to prevent decomposition.

4.2.3 Summary of Security Assumptions

The protocol is considered secure under the following hard problems:

1. Conjugacy Search Problem in $GL(n, \mathbb{F}q[v_1]/\langle f(v)\rangle)$.
2. Matrix Power Problem over Polynomial Rings.
3. Polynomial Matrix Inversion and Decomposition.
4. Lack of Efficient Quantum Algorithms for Non-Abelian Matrix Groups

These assumptions form the foundation of the scheme's post-quantum security. As no polynomial-time (classical or quantum) algorithms are currently known to solve these problems efficiently, the proposed key exchange protocol remains robust against existing cryptanalytic techniques.

Example 4.2.1. Consider the Galois field $\mathbb{F}_2^8[v_1]$ with irreducible polynomial given below.

$$f(v_1) = v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

Define the matrices S and T as:

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & 1 \\ v_1+1 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$ST = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & 1 \\ v_1+1 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1+1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Bilal's Key Generation:

Let $y = 3 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and B_{pub} be a public key,

Bilal computes,

$$B_{pub} = (TS)^y \mod f(v_1)$$

$$B_{pub} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1+1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix}^3 \quad \text{mod } f(v_1)$$

Bilal public his public key B_{pub}.

Ayesha's Key Generation:

Let Ayesha's secret key is $x = 2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and compute her public key A_{pub},

$$A_{pub} = (ST)^x \quad \text{mod } f(v_1)$$

She also publishes her public key A_{pub}

$$A_{pub} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^2$$

$$K_{BA} = ((TS)^y)^x$$

$$K_{BA} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1+1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix}^3 \right)^2 \quad \text{mod } f(v_1)$$

$$K_{BA} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1+1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{mod } v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

Key Exchange Protocol:

Now Bilal computes his shared key by using Ayesha's public key,

$$K_{AB} = (A_{pub})^y$$

$$K_{AB} = ((ST)^x)^y$$

$$K_{AB} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^2 \right)^3 \quad \text{mod } f(v_1)$$

$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^6 \quad \text{mod } v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{mod } f(v_1)$$

Let us compute the inverse of matrix T.

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Compute determinant:

$$\det(T) = (v_1+1)(1) - (v_1+1)(0) \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

$$\det(T) = v_1 + 1 \qquad \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

Adjugate of T:

$$\text{Adj}(T) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1+1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Here Euclidean algorithm is used for computing inverse of $v_1 + 1 \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$.

$Q(v_1)$	$T(v_1)$	$T(v_2)$	$T(v_3)$	$S(v_1)$	$S(v_2)$	$S(v_3)$
	1	0	$v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$	0	1	$v_1 + 1$
v_1	0	1	$v_1 + 1$	1	v_1	1

TABLE 4.1: Inverse of $v_1 + 1 \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$ is v_1.

$$T^{-1} = \det(T)^{-1} \cdot \text{Adj}(T)$$
$$T^{-1} = (v_1+1)^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} v_1+1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$
$$T^{-1} = v_1 \begin{bmatrix} v_1+1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$
$$T^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Verification:

For verification Bilal copmutes,

$$K_{BA} = T^{-1}(TS)^6T$$

Compute $(TS)^6T$:

$$(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1+1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1 \\ v_1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Multiply by T^{-1}

$$T^{-1}(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1 \\ v_1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1}(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1}((TS)^3)^2T = ((ST)^2)^3$$

$$T^{-1}(TS)^6T = (ST)^6$$

As,

$$K_{BA} = (TS)^{35}$$

This show's that,

$$K_{BA} = K_{AB}$$

Similarly verification can be done by this way,

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & 1 \\ v_1+1 & v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\det(S) = v_1(v_1+1) + (v_1+1)(1) \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 = v_1 \qquad \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

Adjugate of S:

$$\text{adj}(S) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1+1 & 1 \\ v_1+1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Compute S^{-1}:

$$S^{-1} = \det(S)^{-1} \cdot \mathrm{Adj}(S)$$

To find the inverse of $v_1 \bmod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$ we use following method.

$Q(v_1)$	$T(v_1)$	$T(v_2)$	$T(v_3)$	$S(v_1)$	$S(v_2)$	$S(v_3)$
	1	0	$v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$	0	1	v_1
$v_1 + 1$	0	1	v_1	1	$v_1 + 1$	1

TABLE 4.2: Inverse of $v_1 \bmod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$ is $v_1 + 1$.

$$S^{-1} = v_1^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} v_1 + 1 & 1 \\ v_1 + 1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

$$S^{-1} = (v_1 + 1) \begin{bmatrix} v_1 + 1 & 1 \\ v_1 + 1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$S^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 + 1 \\ v_1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^2 + v_1 + 1$$

Now compute K_{AB} As,

$$K_{AB} = S^{-1}(ST)^6 S$$

For $S^{-1}(ST)^6 S$ we do following steps,

$$(ST)^6 S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 \\ v_1 + 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & 1 \\ v_1 + 1 & v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(ST)^6 = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 + 1 \\ 1 & v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$S^{-1}(ST)^6 S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 + 1 \\ v_1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1 + 1 \\ 1 & v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$S^{-1}(ST)^6 S = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & v_1 + 1 \\ v_1 & v_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$S^{-1}((ST)^3)^2 S = ((TS)^2)^3$$

$$S^{-1}(ST)^6 S = (TS)^6$$

$$K_{BA} = (TS)^6$$

This show's that,

$$K_{AB} = K_{BA}$$

Hence, the verification is complete.

Example 4.2.2. Consider the Galois field $\mathbb{F}_2^8[v_1]$ with irreducible polynomial given below.

$$f(v_1) = v_1^8 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$

Define the matrices S and T as:

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^5 + v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Computing their product:

$$ST = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod v_1^8 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$

Now, compute TS:

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^5 + v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Bilal's Key Generation:

Let $y = 3 \in \mathbb{Z}$, Bilal computes public key B_{pub} ,

$$B_{pub} = (TS)^y \mod f(v_1)$$

$$B_{pub} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 \end{bmatrix}^3 \mod f(v_1)$$

Bilal public key is B_{pub} .

Ayesha's Key Generation:

Let Ayesha's secret key is $x = 2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and compute her public key A_{pub},

$$A_{pub} = (ST)^x \mod f(v_1)$$

She also publishes her public key A_{pub}

$$A_{pub} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 \end{bmatrix}^2 \mod v_1^8 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$

Key Exchange Protocol:

Now Bilal computeS his shared key by using Ayesha's public key,

$$K_{AB} = (A_{pub})^y$$
$$K_{AB} = ((ST)^x)^y$$
$$K_{AB} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 \end{bmatrix}^2 \right)^3 \mod v_1^8 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$
$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^3 \\ v_1^7 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 \end{bmatrix}^6 \mod v_1^8 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + 1 \\ v_1^5 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^5 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Let us compute the inverse of matrix T. Given matrix:

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Now find Inverse of T.

$$\det(T) = (1)(v_1^3 + v_1 + 1) - (v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1)(0) = v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \mod f(v_1)$$

The adjugate of T is:

$$\text{Adj}(T) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Using the Euclidean algorithm, the inverse of $v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$ modulo $f(v_1)$ is found to be $v_1^7 + v_1^6$. Thus, the inverse of T is:

$$T^{-1} = (v_1^7 + v_1^6) \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$T^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Verification: For verification Bilal copmutes,

$$K_{BA} = T^{-1}(TS)^6T$$

$$(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^3 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^4 + v_1^2 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^3 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^3 + v_1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Now multiply by T^{-1}:

$$T^{-1}(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^3 + 1 & v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^6 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^6 + v_1^3 + v_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$T^{-1}(TS)^6T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 + v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^6 + v_1^5 + v_1^4 + 1 \\ v_1^5 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^5 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} = (ST)^6 \mod f(v_1)$$

$$= ((ST)^2)^3$$

$$= (ST)^6$$

As,

$$K_{AB} = (ST)^6$$

This show's that,

$$K_{BA} = K_{AB}$$

Similarly verification can be done by this way, For finding Inverse of S, compute the determinant of S:

$$\det(S) = (v_1^2+v_1+1)(v_1^4+v_1+1)-(v_1^5+v_1^3+1)(v_1^7+v_1^2) = v_1^7+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1 \mod f(v_1)$$

The adjugate of S is:

$$\text{Adj}(S) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1+1 & v_1^5+v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^7+v_1^2 & v_1^2+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Using the Euclidean algorithm, the inverse of $v_1^7+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1$ modulo $f(v_1)$ is found to be $v_1^7+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1+1$. Thus, the inverse of S is:

$$S^{-1} = (v_1^7+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1+1)\begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1+1 & v_1^5+v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^7+v_1^2 & v_1^2+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^3+1 & v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^3+v_1^2+1 \\ v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^3+1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Verification:

Compute $(ST)^6S$:

$$(ST)^6S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+1 \\ v_1^5+v_1^2+1 & v_1^5+v_1^2+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix} v_1^2+v_1+1 & v_1^5+v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^7+v_1^2 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$= \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1 \\ v_1^6+v_1^5+1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^2+1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Now multiply by S^{-1}:

$$S^{-1}(ST)^6S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^3+1 & v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^3+v_1^2+1 \\ v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^3+1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1 \\ v_1^6+v_1^5+1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^2+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$= \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^3+1 & v_1^7+v_1^6+v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^6+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^4+v_1^2+1 \end{bmatrix} = (TS)^6 \mod f(v_1)$$

$$S^{-1}((ST)^3)^2S = ((TS)^2)^3$$

$$S^{-1}(ST)^6S = (TS)^6$$

As,

$$K_{BA} = (TS)^6$$

This show's that,

$$K_{AB} = K_{BA}$$

Hence, the verification is complete.

Example 4.2.3. Consider the Galois field $\mathbb{F}_2^8[v_1]$ with irreducible polynomial given below.

$$f(v) = v_1^5 + v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1$$

Define the matrices S and T:

$$S = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_1^3+1 & v_1^4 \\ v_1^2+v_1+1 & 1 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^4+v_1 & v_1^2 & v_1^3 \end{bmatrix} \quad , \quad T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 & v_1+1 & v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^2+1 & v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^3+v_1 \\ 1 & v_1 & v_1^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$ST = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^2+1 & v_1^4 & v_1^3 \\ v_1^4+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^6+v_1^4+v_1^3 & v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^7+v_1^3+v_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$ST = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4 & v_1^3 \\ v_1^4+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 & v_1^4 \end{bmatrix}$$

Now,

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^7 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^7+v_1^5+v_1^3+v_1 & v_1+1 & v_1^5+v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^6+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^5+v_1^3 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$TS = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Bilal's Key Generation:

Let $y = 7 \in \mathbb{Z}$

Let B_{pub} be a public key and Bilal computes,

$$B_{pub} = (TS)^y \mod f(v_1)$$

$$B_{pub} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3 \end{bmatrix}^7 \mod f(v_1)$$

Bilal public his key B_{pup}.

Ayesha's Key Generation:

Let Ayesha's secret key is $x = 5 \in \mathbb{Z}$

Ayesha computes her public key A_{pub},

$$A_{pub} = (ST)^x \mod f(v_1)$$

She also publishes her public key A_{pub}

$$A_{pup} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4 & v_1^3 \\ v_1^4+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 & v_1^4 \end{bmatrix}^5$$

Ayesha also computes,

$$K_{BA} = ((TS)^y)^x$$

$$K_{BA} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3 \end{bmatrix}^7 \right)^5 \mod f(v_1)$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$K_{BA} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^3 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Key Exchange Protocol:

Now Bilal computes his shared key by using Ayesha's public key,

$$K_{AB} = (A_{pub})^y$$

$$K_{AB} = ((ST)^x)^y$$

$$K_{AB} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4 & v_1^3 \\ v_1^4+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 & v_1^4 \end{bmatrix}^5 \right)^7$$

$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4 & v_1^3 \\ v_1^4+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1^2 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 & v_1^4 \end{bmatrix}^{35}$$

$$K_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2+1 & v_1^2+1 \\ v_1 & v_1^4+v_1^3 & v_1^3+v_1 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^3+1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

Let us compute the inverse of matrix T

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 & v_1+1 & v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^2+1 & v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^3+v_1 \\ 1 & v_1 & v_1^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Need to calculate inverse of matrix T

$$T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 & v_1+1 & v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^2+1 & v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^3+v_1 \\ 1 & v_1 & v_1^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

We compute the determinant over the polynomial ring $\mathbf{F}_2[v_1]$ using the standard 3*3 determinant formula:

$$\det(T) = v_1^3 \qquad \bmod v_1$$

Then the adjoint of T is,

$$\mathrm{Adj}(T) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

By using the Euclidean algorithm to find the inverse of the polynomials v_1^3 mod $v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1$ follow the following steps identified in the table below:

$Q(v_1)$	$T_1(v_1)$	$T_2(v_1)$	$T_3(v_1)$	S_1	S_2	S_3
0	1	0	$v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1$	0	1	v_1^3
$v_1^2+v_1+1$	0	1	v_1^3	1	$v_1^2+v_1+1$	v_1+1
$v_1^2+v_1+1$	1	$v_1^2+v_1+1$	v_1+1	$v_1^2+v_1+1$	$v_1^4+v_1^2$	1

TABLE 4.3: Inverse of v_1^3 mod $v_1^5+v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1$ is $v_1^4+v_1^2$.

$$T^{-1} = \det(T)^{-1} \cdot \mathrm{Adj}(T)$$

$$T^{-1} = (v_1^3)^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+1 & v_1^2+1 \\ v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1} = (v_1^4 + v_1^2) \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 & v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 \\ v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + 1 & v_1^2 + 1 \\ v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^2 + 1 \\ v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^3 + 1 \\ v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^2 + v_1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

$$T(ST)^{35}T^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^3 & v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 \\ v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$T((ST)^5)^7T^{-1} = ((TS)^7)^5$$

$$T(ST)^{35}T^{-1} = (TS)^{35}$$

Verification:

As,

$$T^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^2 + 1 \\ v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 \\ v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^2 + v_1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

and,

$$(TS)^{35} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3 + v_1^2 & v_1^3 & v_1^4 + v_1 + 1 \\ 0 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 \\ v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^3 + v_1 + 1 \end{bmatrix} \mod f(v_1)$$

After solving its on ApCoCoA we get,

$$T^{-1}(TS)^{35} = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 \\ v_1^4 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + 1 & v_1^4 + v_1^2 + v_1 + 1 \\ v_1^4 + v_1^3 & v_1^3 + v_1^2 + v_1 & v_1^4 + 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1}(TS)^{35}T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^4+1 & v_1^3+v_1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+1 \\ v_1^4+v_1^2+1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+1 & v_1^4+v_1^2+v_1+1 \\ v_1^4+v_1^3 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^4+1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_1^2 & v_1+1 & v_1^3+1 \\ v_1^2+1 & v_1^2+v_1 & v_1^3+v_1 \\ 1 & v_1 & v_1^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1}(TS)^{35}T = \begin{bmatrix} v_1^3+v_1^2 & v_1^3 & v_1^4+v_1+1 \\ 0 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1 \\ v_1^3+v_1+1 & v_1^3+v_1^2+v_1+1 & v_1^4+v_1^3+v_1+1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T^{-1}((TS)^7)^5T = ((ST)^5)^7$$

$$T^{-1}(TS)^{35}T = (ST)^{35}$$

As,

$$K_{BA} = (TS)^{35}$$

This show's that,

$$K_{AB} = K_{BA}$$

Hence, verification has been completed successfully.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

For many years, cryptographic protocols like Diffie–Hellman and RSA have provided reliable means of secure key exchange, based on the computational difficulty of problems such as discrete logarithms and integer factorization. While these assumptions are sound in the classical setting, the introduction of quantum computing presents a significant challenge. Algorithms like Shor's [43] can efficiently solve these hard problems, effectively undermining the security guarantees of conventional cryptosystems. This emerging threat has motivated researchers to develop new cryptographic techniques that remain robust even against quantum-capable adversaries. As a result, post-quantum cryptography [52] has become a critical area of focus, aiming to construct secure protocols based on mathematically hard problems that quantum computers cannot easily solve.

Among the proposed quantum-resistant key exchange protocols, lattice-based schemes such as Kyber [42], code-based systems such as McEliece, multivariate polynomial schemes, and isogeny-based constructions such as SIDH have gained significant attention. These systems rely on problems that are conjectured to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. For instance, Kyber is based on the hardness of learning with errors (LWE) over lattices, which remains difficult even under quantum computation. Although these protocols offer promising security properties, they also come with various trade-offs in terms of key sizes, computational efficiency, and implementation complexity.

In contrast to these mainstream post-quantum approaches, the matrix-based key exchange protocol introduced in this work presents an algebraic alternative grounded in the theory of noncommutative groups. Initially formulated using integer matrices from the general linear group $GL(n, \mathbb{Z})$, the protocol relied on the noncommutative nature of matrix multiplication and the difficulty of recovering exponents from conjugated and exponentiated matrices. Although effective, the use of integer matrices posed challenges in terms of unbounded growth of entries and limited algebraic control over the matrix space.

To address these limitations and further enhance security, the protocol has been extended to utilize matrices with polynomial entries over a finite field, reduced modulo an irreducible polynomial [30]. Specifically, the new construction operates within the group $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle)$, where $f(v_1)$ is an irreducible polynomial of sufficiently high degree over $\mathbb{F}_q$. This shift brings several critical advantages.

First, the use of polynomial matrices enables bounded arithmetic, ensuring that all operations occur in a finite ring. This prevents coefficient explosion during matrix multiplication and exponentiation, which is a common issue when working with unbounded integers. Second, reducing polynomial entries modulo an irreducible polynomial introduces additional algebraic structure, transforming the matrix group into a richer and more complex environment that is significantly harder to analyze or invert. The quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_q[v_1]/\langle f(v_1)\rangle$ behaves like a field when $f(v_1)$ is irreducible, supporting efficient arithmetic while also maintaining high cryptographic hardness.

Furthermore, the security of the protocol is underpinned by problems believed to be resistant to classical and quantum attacks. These include the matrix conjugacy search problem and the matrix power problem, the non commutative ring of polynomial matrices. Unlike traditional discrete logarithm problems in abelian groups, these problems resist existing quantum algorithms. Moreover, due to the non-commutative nature of the matrix group, algebraic reductions or simplifications, which are often exploited in attacks on abelian structures are not readily applicable. The transition from integer matrices to polynomial matrices also facilitates a more structured and efficient implementation. Polynomial arithmetic modulo an irreducible polynomial can be optimized using established techniques from coding theory and algebraic geometry.

Futher, the matrix size, ,n, field size q, and the degree of $f(v_1)$ offer flexible parameters that can be tuned to achieve different security levels and performance profiles, allowing the protocol to be adapted for various application scenarios. We use Applied Computations in Commutative Algebra (ApCoCoA) for solving powers of polynomial based matrices and multipling the big polynomial matrices.

From a theoretical perspective, this matrix-based construction aligns with the broader trend in cryptography of leveraging non-abelian algebraic systems. It shares similarities with braid group cryptography and other group-based approaches, yet distinguishes itself by working within the well-understood linear algebraic framework of matrices and polynomial rings. This balance between structure and complexity makes it both analyzable and robust.

In conclusion, while many promising post quantum protocols exist, the proposed matrix-based key exchange scheme offers a compelling and innovative direction. By moving from integer matrices to modulu, irreducible polynomial matrices, the protocol gains enhanced algebraic depth, computational boundedness, and increased resistance to quantum attacks. Its reliance on hard non-commutative problems and its flexibility in parameter selection position it as a strong candidate for further exploration in the field of post-quantum cryptography. Future work may include rigorous security reductions, performance benchmarking, and integration into larger cryptographic frameworks, such as hybrid encryption systems or digital signature schemes.

Bibliography

[1] S. Singh, *The Code Book: The Science of Secrecy from Ancient Egypt to Quantum Cryptography*. Doubleday, 1999.

[2] L. S. Hill, "Cryptography in an algebraic alphabet," *The American Mathematical Monthly*, vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 306–312, 1929.

[3] W. Stallings, *Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice*. Pearson, 7 ed., 2020.

[4] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, *Introduction to Modern Cryptography*. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2007.

[5] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1996.

[6] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, "New directions in cryptography," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, 1976.

[7] R. R. Leno, S. A. Adleman, and Leonard, "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems," *Communications of the ACM*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978.

[8] J. Kaur and Grewal, "Elgamal: Public-key cryptosystem." Math and Computer Science Department, Indiana State University, 2015.

[9] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, *Introduction to Modern Cryptography*. CRC Press, 3rd ed., 2020.

[10] J. Doe and J. Smith, "A novel cryptosystem based on lattice theory," *Journal of Cryptology*, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 123–145, 2025.

[11] D. Micciancio, "The hardness of the closest vector problem with preprocessing," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1212–1215, 2001. Foundational work on lattice problems in cryptography.

[12] E. Alkim, L. Ducas, T. Pöppelmann, and P. Schwabe, "Post-quantum key exchange—a new hope," in *25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16)*, pp. 327–343, 2016.

[13] P. W. Shor, "Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer," *SIAM Journal on Computing*, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1484–1509, 1997.

[14] D. J. Bernstein, J. Buchmann, and E. Dahmen, *Post-Quantum Cryptography*. Springer, 2009.

[15] E. Alkim, L. Ducas, T. Pöppelmann, and P. Schwabe, "Post-quantum key exchange—a new hope," in *25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16)*, pp. 327–343, 2016.

[16] R. Alvarez, C. Caballero-Gil, J. Santonja, and A. Zamora, "Algorithms for lightweight key exchange," *Sensors*, vol. 17, no. 7, p. 1517, 2017.

[17] C. Gupta and N. S. Reddy, "Enhancement of security of diffie-hellman key exchange protocol using rsa cryptography.," in *Journal of Physics: Conference Series*, vol. 2161, p. 012014, IOP Publishing, 2022.

[18] D. Fischer, "Quantum diffie–hellman key exchange." Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1279, 2021.

[19] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, "Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing," *Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing*, pp. 175–179, 1984.

[20] I. W. Primaatmaja, K. T. Goh, E. Y.-Z. Tan, and V. Scarani, "Security of device-independent quantum key distribution protocols: a review," *arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.04960*, 2022.

[21] E. Alkim, L. Ducas, T. Pöppelmann, and P. Schwabe, "Post-quantum key exchange—a new hope," *26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17)*, pp. 327–343, 2017.

[22] J. Sowa, B. Hoang, A. Yeluru, S. Qie, A. Nikolich, R. Iyer, and P. Cao, "Post-quantum cryptography (pqc) network instrument: Measuring pqc adoption rates and identifying migration pathways," in *2024 IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)*, vol. 1, pp. 1835–1846, IEEE, 2024.

[23] J. I. Escribano Pablos, "Secure post-quantum group key exchange: Implementing a solution based on kyber," *IET Communications*, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 758–773, 2023.

[24] A. Babiker, "New quantum-safe versions of decisional diffie–hellman assumption in the general linear group and their applications." arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.04637, 2021.

[25] L. A. Lizama-Pérez, "A matrix multiplication approach to quantum-safe cryptographic systems," *Cryptography*, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 56, 2024.

[26] W. Stallings, *Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice*. Boston: Pearson Education, 7th ed., 2017.

[27] C. E. Shannon, "Communication theory of secrecy systems," *Bell system technical journal*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.

[28] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, *Introduction to Modern Cryptography*. CRC Press, 3rd ed., 2020.

[29] T. W. Hungerford, *Algebra*. Springer, 8 ed., 2003.

[30] D. S. Dummit and R. M. Foote, *Abstract Algebra*. Wiley, 3 ed., 2004.

[31] G. Strang, *Introduction to Linear Algebra*. Wellesley, MA: Wellesley-Cambridge Press, 5th ed., 2016.

[32] H. Anton and C. Rorres, *Elementary Linear Algebra*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 11th ed., 2010.

[33] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2004. Available online.

[34] G. Strang, *Introduction to Linear Algebra*. Wellesley-Cambridge Press, 5 ed., 2016.

[35] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, *Matrix Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, 2 ed., 2013.

[36] J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, and J. H. Silverman, *An Algebraic Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography*. Undergraduate Texts in Mathematics, Springer, 2008.

[37] C. Paar and J. Pelzl, *Understanding Cryptography: A Textbook for Students and Practitioners*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2010.

[38] I. Bashir, *Mastering Blockchain: Distributed Ledger Technology, Decentralization, and Smart Contracts Explained*. Packt Publishing, 2nd ed., 2018.

[39] O. Regev, "On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography," *Journal of the ACM (JACM)*, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 1–40, 2009.

[40] C. Gentry, "Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices," *STOC '09: Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pp. 169–178, 2009.

[41] S. D. Galbraith, *Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

[42] J. Bos, L. Ducas, E. Kiltz, T. Lepoint, V. Lyubashevsky, J. M. Schanck, P. Schwabe, G. Seiler, and D. Stehlé, "Crystals-kyber: A cca-secure module-lattice-based kem," *2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, pp. 353–367, 2018.

[43] P. W. Shor, "Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer," *SIAM Review*, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 303–332, 1999.

[44] L. K. Grover, "A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search," *Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pp. 212–219, 1996.

[45] M. E. Hellman, "Cryptanalytic time-memory trade-offs," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 401–406, 1980.

[46] J. M. Pollard, "Monte carlo methods for index computation (mod p)," *Mathematics of Computation*, vol. 32, no. 143, pp. 918–924, 1978.

[47] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*. CRC Press, 1996. Available online.

[48] P. Kocher, "Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, rsa, dss, and other systems," *Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO'96*, pp. 104–113, 1996.

[49] J.-C. Faugère and A. Joux, "Algebraic cryptanalysis of the pkc'2006 algebraic cryptanalysis challenge," *Public Key Cryptography*, pp. 35–50, 2009.

[50] A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich, "Decomposition attacks on symmetric key algorithms," *Selected Areas in Cryptography*, pp. 72–88, 2011.

[51] O. Regev, "On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography," *Journal of the ACM (JACM)*, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 1–40, 2009.

[52] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, *Quantum Computation and Quantum Information*. Cambridge University Press, 10th anniversary edition ed., 2010.